Introduction
Regional elections matter. Their political impact can go beyond the competences of regional governments, for example as they can send signals to the national government (Anderson & Ward, 1996; Rogers, 2016) . Regional elections can also matter for the analysis of national party systems and their change.
From an analytical perspective concerned with national party systems, we can read and understand regional electoral developments through several lenses (for an overview: Hough & Jeffery, 2006) . The first focus investigates regional peculiarities, and in issues and grievances that are particularly salient in different regions, related to regional-specific issues (Giger, Müller, & Debus, 2011), or to (ethno-) territorial conflicts (e.g. Evans & O'Leary, 2000; Caspersen, 2006) . The second approach views regional elections as second-order elections which allow voters to express grievances with national-level politics or the national economy (e.g. Rogers, 2016; Jeffery & Hough, 2003) . Thirdly, if electoral swings are mirrored at the national and regional level, and across different regions, then regional elections can be read as a barometer for national elections to come (Simon, Ostrom, & Marra, 1991; Anderson & of electoral contestation, cantonal and national? (3) Are changes driven top-down, so that national elections set a precedent for further developments in the cantons (e.g. due to new cleavages, national institutional change, or national party campaigns), or do changes emerge bottom-up from the cantons, spread across them, and spill over to national elections?
Swiss elections, and the Swiss party system, even though atypical in many aspects, are suited for a study of the spill-over effect of electoral swings. Subnational elections are held nonsimultaneously, allowing for a temporal dependency. The party system is very stable: despite its heavy fractionalisation, the Swiss party system is characterised by one of the lowest degrees of inter-election volatility both in Western Europe, and across all democracies.
1 In other words, electoral changes are often very minor, and in particular, they usually remain significantly below the confidence intervals in pre-election polls. Additionally, in the absence of short-term retrospective economic voting electoral swings or other second-order effects, 
The institutional setup and the party system
Elections to regional parliaments and executives in Switzerland are exceptional in the international context, due to their institutional heterogeneity. The 26 Swiss cantons enjoy a very far-reaching autonomy in determining their constitutional structure. The national parliament retains a veto right to constitutional reforms in the cantons, but in reality, it does not intervene in the institutional order of the cantons, so that the Federal Court is the only national body active in providing some limited guidelines for the political organisation of the cantons.
xxx Table 1 about here xxx Sources: (Bochsler & Wasserfallen, 2013; Leuzinger & Kuster, 2018) The 26 cantons elect their parliaments and governments each according to their own electoral calendar (see table 1 ). For parliamentary elections, all cantons except for five 2 have moved from majoritarian to proportional election rules (Lutz & Strohmann, 1998) . The size of proportional districts varies widely.
As a consequence of this wide variance, the number of smaller parties competing for seats and votes differs considerably across and within cantons (Vatter, 2003) . The electoral system at the cantonal level correlates only partly with the district magnitude in federal elections. In some cantons, federal elections are much more competitive than those that determine cantonal ones, and vice-versa (Selb, 2006) . This contributes to incongruence between the elections at the two levels.
In all 26 cantons, the cantonal executives, counting 5 to 7 ministers, are elected by the people -mostly by majority vote. Consociational multiparty governments are the rule, not the exception: almost all mandates in cantonal governments are held by the four largest national parties and, more recently, the Greens (Linder, 2012: 103-104) . However, the inclusiveness and proportionality of these government coalitions has declined as a result of an increasing number of splits within the political majority since the 1990s (Bochsler & Bousbah, 2015) . In 2014-2017 period, four cantons (Nidwald, Zoug, Schwyz, Valais) elected their cantonal parliaments for the first time according to new, bi-proportional electoral laws. Votes expressed for small parties which fail to win seats in small districts are no longer lost, but contribute to the overall cantonal result of these parties, and are considered in the overall seat allocation. Bi-proportional seat allocation operates using a multi-tier proportional formula, based on the Sainte-Laguë formula. Seats are allocated in small electoral districts, but a cantonal compensation mechanism guarantees proportional seat allocation at the cantonal level, based on the cantonal vote total (Pukelsheim, 2009) . In contrast to other multi-tier PR models (e.g. in Scandinavian democracies), the bi-proportional formula operates with no upper-tier mandates; all mandates are allocated in electoral districts.
Reforms in the 2014-2017 period
However, as most of the cantons have introduced legal thresholds along with their electoral reforms, the potential effect is contained. Two of the cantons (Zoug, Schwyz) stand out, as they have a considerable number of single-seat districts. Vote returns from these districts are now included in the overall proportional seat allocation. In a fifth canton, Uri, the electoral reform process has stalled at time of writing. Electoral reforms have profited small parties -in particular those on the political left.
Similar to cantonal electoral systems, which were deemed unconstitutional by the Federal Court, the national parliament (first chamber) is elected in very unequally sized districts, with proportional districts ranging between 2 and 35 seats, and 6 councillors from small cantons elected by single-seat plurality. In reaction to the cantonal reforms, several national MPs (some of whom are also involved in cantonal politics) have proposed electoral reforms for national elections along the lines of the cantonal reforms. However, such reforms would produce more losers than winners among the largest parties. It is thus no wonder that the reforms have repeatedly failed to win a majority of votes in parliament. Furthermore, the Federal Court can assess the constitutionality of cantonal laws, including constitutional norms at the cantonal level, but cannot do so for laws applying to the national level.
Other important electoral reforms have taken place in the cantons of Zoug and Basel-City. In 2014, Zoug moved from government elections by PR to majoritarian rules. In 2017, BaselCity decided to abolish legal electoral thresholds. The canton practices the Sainte-Laguë seat allocation formula, with a district magnitude of 11-34. Sainte-Laguë in large districts without any thresholds implies that very small parties can gain representation in parliament.
Territorial splits in the party system
The Swiss party system developed bottom-up. The parties originated in loosely organised political movements around influential politicians at the level of the cantons, which formed party federations at the national level (Gruner, 1977) . Some of the historical cleavages in Switzerland, in particular the conflict between church and state, or Catholics and a SecularProtestant alliance, follow territorial lines. This has also lead to vastly different party systems, especially with regard to the party representing the centre-right. The Catholic-majority cantons used to be dominated by the Christian Democrats (PPD), the protestant, agrarian cantons were characterised by a strong Swiss People's Party (UDC), whereas the Radicals (PLR) were strong in industrial and urban areas. The Liberals (PLS) used to complement the Radicals with a very similar programmatic profile in the cantons with a French-speaking majority. The Social Democrats (PS) were strong in cities, but their electorate was territorially more evenly distributed. Overall, the party system is more diverse in the urban and protestant cantons (Vatter, 2002; Ladner, 2004) . Only since the 1990s, have new political cleavages, the nationalisation of electoral behaviour (Bochsler et al., 2016) , and a degree of gradual professionalisation of the parties' central offices (Ladner & Brändle, 2001 ) created a genuine national pattern of competition. Nevertheless, cantonal party branches still profit from a large degree of autonomy.
The rise of a new cultural cleavage around issues related to social liberalisation and globalisation/European integration, has fundamentally affected the Swiss party system. It has led to a reconfiguration of the left, the rise of the Green party (on the economic left). The Swiss People's Party, a formerly centrist agrarian party, repositioned itself as a nationalistconservative party (Bornschier, 2015) first in the German-speaking cantons, and only later, and to a lesser extent, in the French-speaking areas. Over the course of this change, since the 1990s, the importance of territorial splits has declined considerably. The change has brought an end to dominant-party systems in the cantons, has led to the establishment of local branches of most major parties in almost all cantons, and has seen the significant electoral decline of the two previously dominant parties of the centre-right, the Christian Democrats and the Radical party (merged with the Liberals in 2007).
New centre-right parties, the Green-Liberals (PVL) and the Bourgeois-Democratic Party (PBD) have expanded gradually: the PVL from a few cantons to primarily urban areas, and the PBD from three German-speaking protestant cantons to other agrarian-protestant areas.
They have quickly expanded beyond their traditional fiefs, but remain limited in their electoral appeal, and anchored in the German-speaking parts of the country. The key question is whether the parties will survive, merge with larger parties, or disappear.
While these changes contribute to a harmonisation of the party systems in the cantons, and to a nationalisation of the national elections, the next section analyses whether electoral swings in cantonal elections precede electoral swings in national elections. Some narratives relate shifts in the Swiss party system to national factors, such as economic change resulting in the reshaping of the cleavage structure (Bornschier, 2015) , or the professionalisation of the national party offices, and a gradual nationalisation of media structures and election campaigns. Other narratives relate the changes in the party system to key events at the level of cantons. A paradigmatic case thereof is the nationalist-conservative turn of the UDC, which had its roots in a new strategy of the Zurich branch of the party. In a gradual process, new party cadres with a radical style and position, following the new programmatic direction, took control of other cantonal party branches. In cantons with no previous UDC presence, especially catholic cantons, new party branches loyal to the Zurich party wing were established. While this initially led to fierce programmatic conflicts in the national party, the Zurich-based wing quickly gained control over the party. In a similar vein, the Bourgeois-Democratic Party was founded as a UDC-splinter group in three cantons as a result of programmatic conflict involving both the national and the cantonal level of the party.
Research question and methodology
The Green-Liberals originated from internal party conflicts in the Zurich branch of the Green party, and a split at the cantonal level. 
Data and method

The models
I scrutinise different models of electoral swings using cantonal election results for political parties since the 1990s, and national parliamentary election (first chamber) results at the level of the cantons. The cantons serve as the electoral constituencies for national elections. I
employ different multivariate models in order to analyse the sequence and diffusion of electoral swings in cantonal elections and in national elections (table 2) . Similar to prediction models, the models highlight conjunctures of electoral change between elections at the same level (cantonal or national), as well as across levels (figure 2). 3 The models offer a descriptive analytical view of the sequencing of national and cantonal electoral swings, and the diffusion of electoral change across cantons. The models build on a range of theoretical models on connections across elections at different levels, as reviewed by Gaines and Crombez (2004) .
Each of the two models includes two different sets of variables to understand how electoral change is interconnected.
The first set of variables, labelled 'cantonal swings', suggests that each cantonal party system develops differently. Accordingly, I rely on the experience of previous cantonal elections to predict electoral change in subsequent national elections, and vice-versa, always measuring change in the same canton.
-
The second set of variables measures 'national swings'. It relies on the expectation that changes in the party system and in electoral trends diffuse between cantons. elections are held only a few months after national elections (to the first chamber of parliament), and it is most likely that they echo to the national election campaign from the previous year. Other cantonal parliaments are elected only half a year before the national parliament elections take place, and are widely considered as test elections, which represent the larger electoral trends. 6 Hence, it is plausible that the strength and direction of cantonal and national swings depends on the timing in the electoral cycle. The statistical models allow for such variation by interacting the variables for cantonal and national swings with a variable for the timing of the election. 7 The timing of the election is also included in the variance part of the models. In cantons where more time has elapsed between elections at different levels, I
expect the predictive capacity of the model to be lower, and the unexplained variance higher.
Second, there is variance in the electoral rules. In the elections to the Swiss national parliament, cantons with only one seat elect their representatives by plurality vote. Generally, elections in very small electoral districts can be highly sensitive to strategic effect and effects of candidate entry (the variance-effect of district magnitude is estimated in table 3, in the first 5 As the number of elections for which vote returns are available keeps growing, future research might look into different degrees of inter-dependency between the cantons. 6 National parliamentary elections take place on the third of fourth Sunday in October. The cantonal parliamentary elections are held in national election years, typically between February and May. 7 I have tested other operationalisations, e.g. the inclusion of binary variables for each year of the election cycle, in interaction with the cantonal and national swings. They did not improve the results. specification). Therefore, I only include cantons with at least three seats in the national parliament in the calculations. In addition, the canton of Grisons (cantonal elections by majoritarian rules) is excluded, as no vote shares from cantonal elections are available. The district magnitude in the elections to the national parliament is included in the variance part of the model, as I expect that in larger districts, the predictions will be more accurate.
xxx Table 2 about here xxx
In the first set of models, I assess the electoral change in national parliamentary elections between 1995 and 2015. The vote change in the parties' cantonal electoral results y i,j,t is nested in parties i, cantons j, and election years t.
μ i,j,t = α + β 1 · cantonal change i,j,t + β 2 · years since cantonal el. j,t + β 3 · cant change i,j,t · years j,t + β 4 · national swing i,t + β 5 · national swing i,t · years j,t + ε σ i,j,t 2 = exp(α σ + γ 1 vote share i,j,t +γ 2 years j,t +γ 3 magnitude i,j,t +γ 4 year t )
xxx figure 2 about here xxx Sequencing is crucial both in the first and the second statistical model. Both models show how electoral change is related to electoral volatility in previous elections, thus avoiding possible problems of endogeneity. Only in the second model, for the national swings, do I use the results from cantonal elections in the same year in order to capture (short-term) diffusion effects.
Quantitative analysis, 1990-2017
The empirical models introduced in the previous section explain, first, electoral gains and losses in national elections (with cantonal parties as the unit of analysis), before moving to electoral change in cantonal elections.
Electoral change in national elections (1st step)
I run four models (see table 3 ). The first model is a variance-model, predicting not only the vote change in national elections, but also the accuracy of the prediction. The model is more accurate for small parties, cantons with a large district magnitude, and for cantons where the cantonal elections are held at the beginning of the national electoral cycle, and it is less accurate for more recent elections. The second model is an empty hierarchical model, the third a fully specified hierarchical model. In the fourth model, I change the dependent variable, and use the vote share in national elections (%) instead of the vote gains, and include a lagged dependent variable. Results are robust across all models, and displayed in figure 3.
xxx Table 3 about here xxx xxx Figure 3 about here xxx
In a nutshell, we see that both cantonal election trends as well as national swings are important for understanding electoral change in national elections. As the left panel in figure 3 shows, for cantons with cantonal elections in the same year as national elections, the trends in 
Electoral change in cantonal elections (2nd step)
In the second set of models, I reverse the direction of the analysis: here, I predict the election result in cantonal elections (see table 2 xxx Table 4 The Liberal-Radical party was able to make the most important gains on the right. Until 2014, the party was on the losing side, but has since gained grounds in the national parliamentary elections and in most cantonal elections (see figure 1 and figure 5 , left-hand side).
The Christian Democratic Party (PPD) saw its representation further decline, losing ground in all but five cantonal parliamentary elections in the period of investigation. The most important losses can be observed in the party's strongholds, the catholic-dominated cantons, in some of which it now ranks second after the Swiss People's Party (UDC). The result is disappointing for the new national leadership, which has attempted to reposition the party from a centrist party to a Christian party with a conservative touch. 9 Vice-versa, the UDC managed to make further gains in some of the previous PPD strongholds, but suffered a strong backlash, losing more than half of its parliamentary representation in the French-speaking canton of Neuchâtel.
The French-speaking cantonal branches of the UDC lag significantly behind the more successful branches in the German-speaking cantons (see figure 1) . Also, the election of a French-speaking UDC representative into the national government did not lead to the upsurge the party was hoping for.
10
The Bourgeois-Democratic Party (PBD), a UDC splinter group, is struggling for survival. In the period of investigation, the party suffered minor electoral losses in some cantons, which do not belong to its strongholds. However, the slowdown of its electoral decline in two of its strongholds in elections in early 2018 11 is a crucial factor for survival. French-speaking cantons. Still, this raises the possibility that they might recover in the subsequent national elections 2019.
Both the Greens and the Green Liberals could gain mandates in cantons which have introduced a new, more proportional electoral system (Nidwald, Zoug, Schwyz and Valais).
13
In the aftermath of the right-wing shift in the national parliamentary elections, the Social Democrats presented themselves as the opposition to a new right-wing majority in the lower chamber of the parliament. They mobilised with this message both in national-level referendums and in cantonal elections.
While campaigns are run largely by the cantonal branches, and the cantonal parties determine the issues of their campaigns autonomously, cantonal branches occasionally refer to national political issues, as they are more visible and salient than cantonal ones. Some parties have also recently strengthened the role of their central party office in cantonal campaigns. In particular, the Social Democratic party (PS) has introduced a similar umbrella campaign concept across elections. In a few cantons, militants of the Social Democratic party addressed potential supporters through phone calls. 14 Canvassing is unusual for election campaigns in Switzerland, it was used first by the PS in cantonal elections in Zurich and Lucerne in 2015,
followed by the 2016 elections in Basel and Argovia, and in 2017 in Soleure. This allowed the PS to make small electoral gains, although they are confined to the German-speaking cantons.
The party somewhat lost ground in the French-speaking areas.
Executive elections
The trends in elections to cantonal parliaments and governments do not evolve in parallel. In elections to cantonal governments, the period since 2014 has seen an end to the trends of the 13 Before the introduction of the new, bi-proportional formula, in many electoral constituencies the Greens would not present an own candidate, or would run on a joint list with the Social Democrats. The main losers of the reform were the parties with the strongest representation in these cantons, the PLR, PPD, and in Schwyz and Nidwald, the UDC. 14 Information obtained from Marco Kistler, PS campaign manager.
previous decades, and shows a remarkable break in Swiss politics. The Swiss People's Party has won a series of mandates in cantonal executives, and in a few years reached its peak in its representation in executive office. This is mirrored by substantial losses on the political left, both by the Social Democrats and the Greens (see figure 5 ).
While the reasons for gains and losses of single mandates can contain idiosyncratic elements, such as the role of incumbency or local scandals, several of these government changeovers have resulted (also) as a consequence of a renewed alliance of the centre-right parties. This constitutes a major turn in the arithmetic of elections to cantonal governments.
Until the 1990s, elections to Swiss cantonal governments were widely characterised by a pattern of (quasi-)proportionality, popularly referred to as "voluntary proportionality". The centre-right wing parties, the PLR, PPD, UDC and/or PLS were in the majority in almost all cantons. In some cantons, one of the parties dominated, and in most other cantons, the centreright formed a stable alliance, which played an important role in policy-formation and could control the popular elections of governments by majoritarian rule. However, it usually left one or two seats for the political minority, typically the Social Democrats. In almost all cantons, the resulting pattern was a very stable government formula, typically providing for a slight over-representation of the right, and an under-representation of the left, although publically perceived as a roughly proportional government formula. No matter whether the Social Democrats accepted the informal deal or challenged it, they could count on a stable, minority representation in most cantonal executives (Gruner, 1977: 24; Bochsler & Bousbah, 2015) .
The process of polarisation of the party system culminated in the 1990s, with a major change in the functioning of the Swiss consociational system of government (Bochsler, Hänggli, & Häusermann, 2015) . This also changed the nature of executive elections in the cantons: the change in the major cleavages has led to a break in the centre-right alliance. Gradually, canton by canton, the UDC has moved from a position in the political centre to a fierce oppositional role as a nationalist-conservative force. In some cantons, this has directly provoked a massive increase in the competitiveness of governmental elections. Until the 1980s, it was rare for the number of viable candidates to outnumber the number of executive seats, but with the end of electoral alliances, parties began to claim an increased representation in government, and elections became competitive. Where the party elites of the centre-right continued to engage in electoral alliances, they did not lead to the desired results, as partisan voters were no longer willing to support all candidates of the alliance. Either way, the growing split of the centreright into a moderate camp (PLR and PPD) and a radical pole (UDC) benefitted the left-wing minority: elections became open and competitive, and the unified right-wing electoral blocs disappeared, canton by canton (Bochsler & Bousbah, 2015) . As a result, the PS and the 
Discussion and conclusions
The Swiss party system is built as a federal conglomeration of cantonal party branches.
Historically, party-like ideological movements emerged first at the cantonal level, and then joined as national party federations (Thorlakson, 2007) . The organisation of elections is heavily decentralised, and until recently, national parliamentary elections were often also characterised as parallel contests in the 26 cantons. Recent years have seen important changes to the party system: the electorate has re-aligned along altered cleavages, and the parties have become more national (Bochsler et al., 2016) .  The cantons as echo chambers: Change in national elections usually also resonates the year after, in subsequent cantonal elections. However, this effect declines quickly.
Elections held in the second to fourth year of the national election cycle can best be predicted by looking at the electoral swings in other cantons, and only few trends seem to stem from previous national elections.
 Local context matters: There are important differences between national and cantonal elections due to institutional differences between the two levels, but also due to the role of personalities, or other idiosyncratic, context-specific effects. The variance models show that institutional effects and idiosyncratic effects are stronger in cantons with a small number of mandates in the national parliament (and thus stronger institutional restraints) than in larger districts. General rules, which aim to foster an understanding of election swings, do not apply to the same degree to small cantons or majoritarian elections. Instead, strategic and idiosyncratic effects can lead to significant deviations from national trends (Bochsler & Wasserfallen, 2013) .
The analysis of the cantonal elections between 2014 and 2017, the focus of this issue, corresponds to long-term effects. In the cantonal elections of 2015, the PLR initiated an electoral renewal, which was continued in the national parliamentary elections of 2015. The
Green party, one of the main losers of the 2015 national elections, was able to establish a counter-trend in the cantonal elections of 2017, and hopes to recover in the national elections of 2019. The small centre-right parties, PBD and PVL, find themselves under pressure. While the PVL has a broader, but small basis, in a larger number of cantons.
As more data points will become available, future research might analyse further variation of territorial and cross-level spill-over effects, e.g. how they are affected by changes in the party system.
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